Code of canon law 1983 pdf download

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Books Video icon An illustration of two cells of a film strip. See also Breyer, supra note 32 , at "Given this statutory background, what would a reasonable human being intend this specific language to accomplish? See Manning, Without the Pretense of Legislative Intent , supra note 41 , at , describing purposivism as a belief that "the judiciary respect[s] legislative supremacy by implementing the apparent legislative plan of action," or by "supplying sensible means of carrying out legislative policies that Congress cannot possibly spell out completely in a world of great and ever-changing complexity".

Breyer, supra note 32 , at As one textbook pithily asks, "Shouldn't it make a normative difference that a statute was enacted by legislators seeking to solve a social problem in the face of disagreement, and not by a drunken mob of legislators with no apparent purpose or who had agreed to adopt any bill chosen by a throw of the dice? Breyer, supra note 32 , at arguing that if legislators knew courts would not consider the legislative history that legislators considered critical to determining the meaning of a statute, the relevant policymakers "might not have agreed on the legislation".

See also Breyer, supra note 32 , at "Sometimes [a court] can simply look to the surrounding language in the statute or to the entire statutory scheme and ask, 'Given this statutory background, what would a reasonable human being intend this specific language to accomplish? In such situations, legislative history may provide a clear and helpful resolution.

See also discussion infra " Legislative History. See Levi, supra note 38 , at , The judge should try to think his way as best he can into the minds of the enacting legislators and imagine how they would have wanted the statute applied to the case at bar.

Posner distinguishes his own suggestion from the approach of Hart and Sacks by arguing the judge should attempt to take into account the actual compromises struck. Public Utils. Comm'n, U. See also Breyer, supra note 32 , at noting difficulties of ascribing an "intent" to Congress, but concluding that it is possible.

Quicken Loans, Inc. But see, e. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation , Harv. Taylor, Structural Textualism , 75 B. Burwell, S. Frank H. Pol'y 59, 65 Holmes, supra note 66 , at "[W]e ask, not what this man meant, but what those words would mean in the mouth of a normal speaker of English, using them in the circumstances in which they were used, and it is to the end of answering this last question that we let in evidence as to what the circumstances were.

Manning, Without the Pretense of Legislative Intent , supra note 41 , at emphasis omitted quoting Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, U. See also Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent , supra note 16 , at "[F]or textualists, any attempt to overlay coherence on a statutory text that otherwise seems to have problems of fit unacceptably threatens to undermine the bargaining process that produced it.

Scalia, supra note 82 , at See also Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism , supra note 43 , at examining parallels between textualism and legal realism. Each move greatly increases the discretion, and therefore the power, of the court. Frankfurter, supra note 8 , at "And so the bottom problem is: What is below the surface of the words and yet fairly a part of them?

Especially not when we know that laws have no 'spirit,' that they are complex compromises with limits and often with conflicting provisions, the proponents of which have discordant understandings. Legislative history shows the extent of agreement.

For an explanation of when textualists might employ legislative history, see infra " Purposes for Using Legislative History. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent , supra note 16 , at Union Planters Bank, N. See Abbe R. See also William N. We think these commentators are wrong, both descriptively and normatively: Judges' approaches to statutory interpretation are generally eclectic, not inspired by any grand theory, and this is a good methodology.

See Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism , supra note 43 , at 3 "Given that nonadherents and adherents of textualism alike place great weight on statutory text and look beyond text to context, it is hard to tell what remains of the textualism-purposivism debate. Many textualists do impose more restrictions than the typical intentionalist on the evidence of intent that they are willing to consider, but those restrictions need not reflect any fundamental disagreement about the goals of interpretation.

NLRB v. SW Gen. But see SW Gen. Compare id. See Arlington Cent. Murphy, U. See SW Gen. In addition to the tools discussed below, courts also rely on judicial precedent; that is, if another case has previously interpreted a particular statutory provision, a judge may afford that prior interpretation some significance. Krishnakumar, Reconsidering Substantive Canons , 84 U. However, this process of reasoning is more or less similar to the way courts normally resolve cases. This report focuses on judicial tools specifically used to interpret statutes, and accordingly, does not discuss this use of judicial precedent.

Nonetheless, it is important to note that judges sometimes adopt a "super-strong presumption of correctness for statutory precedents," meaning that they will be even more likely to adhere to a prior decision about statutory meaning than they would in any other decisional context. Brick Co. Illinois, U. See Anita S.

Krishnakumar, Dueling Canons , 65 Duke L. Scholars sometimes use "plain meaning" to refer to the "literalist" school of statutory interpretation, supra note 50 , and use "ordinary meaning" to refer to the concept invoked by modern textualists. This report does not make this distinction and instead focuses primarily on modern invocations of the concept by courts, which do not generally distinguish the terms in this way. See Stephen C. Stenberg v. Carhart, U. Cooper, U.

Hedden, U. Courts may also look to the meaning of a term at the time of the statute's enactment, if there is evidence the meaning has changed over time. See Solan, supra note , at "During most of American judicial history, the predominant methodology for discovering ordinary meaning has been introspection. Without fanfare, judges simply rely upon their own sense of how common words are typically used. Certainly, if the chief executive officer of a corporation approached the chief financial officer and said, 'I have something personal to tell you,' we would not assume the CEO was about to discuss company business.

See Solan, supra note , at "[T]he biggest change in the search for word meaning in the past twenty years is the. An unabridged dictionary is simply an historical record, not necessarily all-inclusive, of the meanings which words in fact have borne, in the judgment of the editors, in the writings of reputable authors. But see James J. Warren Co. Of Envtl.

Meyer, U. Burton, U. Cloer, U. United States, S. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. The inquiry demands argument, and meaning requires construction. Lawrence M. Solan, The Language of Judges 98 "When we speak of clarity in construing the concepts expressed by statutes, we are not really making statements about the clarity of the concepts themselves.

Rather, we are expressing judgments about the goodness of fit between the statutory concept and the thing or event in the world that is the subject of dispute. Chapman v. Higbee Co. Solan, supra note , at 13, 26 arguing most plain meaning is determined by "what linguists call a generative grammar, the set of internalized rules and principles that permit us, unselfconsciously, to speak and understand language with ease and with great rapidity," and claiming that in determining whether a statute is ambiguous, "the question is whether the meaning of the disputed language is determined fully by our generative grammars, or whether disputed aspects of the meaning are left open as part of the residue of meaning that our internal grammars do not fully determine".

Compare, e. Because the fibers absorb the alcohol, the LSD solidifies inside the paper rather than on it. You cannot pick a grain of LSD off the surface of the paper. Ordinary parlance calls the paper containing tiny crystals of LSD a mixture.

Would the gelatin be a part of the mixture or substance in an LSD case if a defendant sprayed an LSD-alcohol solution into a capsule, but not if a grain of LSD were placed into the capsule with a tweezers? It is not enough to say that 'ordinary usage' precludes including the weight of a heavy glass bottle.

The words 'mixture or substance' are ambiguous. Easterbrook, Statutes ' Domains , 50 U. See Ward Farnsworth et al. But it would cut [18 U. Hall, U. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. United Sav. Ass'n of Tex. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs. In their book cataloguing the canons of construction, Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner describe this concept as part of the "whole text canon.

See United Sav. Ass ' n of Tex. Gardner, U. City of Chicago v. Fund, U. But cf. Caraco Pharm. Turkette, U. Canons are expressly intended to limit judicial discretion by rooting interpretive decisions in a system of aged and shared principles.

When the conditions presupposed by a canon do not obtain, then it should not be used. A canon. For more discussion of the theoretical arguments for and against using the canons, see infra " Justifications: Disrepute and Rehabilitation. See infra " Justifications: Disrepute and Rehabilitation. The list in the latter casebook builds upon the list given in William N. Stephenson, Legislation and Regulation: Cases and Materials 2d ed.

The use of semantic canons can therefore be understood simply as a form of textual analysis. Law Sch. This is based on our view that the plain meaning rule is the constitutionally compelled starting place for any statutory construction and that tools of interpretation are only applicable when, for whatever reason, the plain meaning rule fails to provide the answer.

Judges also disagree about whether the plain meaning rule is a special and superior canon. Peters, N. Comm'r, F. Barnhart v. Thomas, U. See also Lockhart v. That is particularly true where it takes more than a little mental energy to process the individual entries in the list, making it a heavy lift to carry the modifier across them all.

Suppose your friend told you not that she wants to meet 'an actor, director, or producer involved with Star Wars,' [in which case the modifier would apply to the entire list] but instead that she hopes someday to meet 'a President, Supreme Court Justice, or actor involved with Star Wars.

This canon is also sometimes referred to as the "canon against superfluity. P'ship, U. Franklin, U. Bailey v. See Microsoft Corp. See Kavanaugh, supra note , at "[H]umans speak redundantly all the time, and it turns out that Congress may do so as well. Congress might do so inadvertently. Or Congress might do so intentionally in order to, in Shakespeare's words, make 'double sure. Solimino, U. See Solan, supra note , at 65 stating substantive canons "stack the deck in favor of one party and against another" ; People v.

Hall, N. Ameritech Servs. See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. Gulf Coast Bldg. Trades Council, U. This cardinal principle. Crowell v. Benson, U. This canon is distinct from other variations on the principle of constitutional avoidance, including the "rule of judicial procedure" stating that "'if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction.

Valley Auth. Resendiz-Ponce, U. The procedural rule tells a court when to decide a statutory question i. This report uses the term to refer to the canon, although there is room for disagreement regarding how to classify various aspects of the constitutional avoidance doctrine. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Sebelius, U.

A court might cite the constitutional-avoidance canon as support for its conclusion that a particular reading of a statute is the best interpretation, but in that instance, the canon likely is not bearing any analytical weight. Such a standard would deprive the doctrine of all function. Rather, the doctrine of constitutional doubt comes into play when the statute is 'susceptible of' the problem-avoiding interpretation—when that interpretation is reasonable , though not necessarily the best.

Attorney General v. See also Eric S. Crowell , U. Brown v. Plata, U. Velazquez, U. Some judges have argued that the constitutional-avoidance canon should be used sparingly, if at all. In doing so they expand, very questionably in my view, the effective scope of the Constitution, creating a constitutional penumbra in which statutes wither, shrink, are deformed. A better case for flexible interpretation is presented when the alternative is to nullify Congress's action: when in other words there is not merely a constitutional question about, but a constitutional barrier to, the statute when interpreted literally.

X-Citement Video, Inc. In the instant case, the rule directly supports petitioner's contention that the Government must prove knowledge of illegality to convict him. Monsanto, U. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom , supra note , at "[I]t has been many years since any legal scholar had a good word to say about any but one or two of the canons, but scholarly opinion.

Llewellyn, supra note 71 , at Frankfurter, supra note 8 , at "[C]anons of construction. See also SEC v. Joiner Leasing Corp. An almost equally impressive collection can be made of decisions holding that remedial statutes should be liberally construed. What, then, shall we say of the construction of a [statute] like this which may be the basis of either civil proceedings of a preventive or remedial nature or of punitive proceedings, or perhaps both?

Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom , supra note , at USI Film Prods. Solan, supra note , at 31 suggesting some canons embody two "types of devices," reflecting the way English speakers generally understand language: "[1] interpretive strategies that function to ease the rapid processing of language as it is heard or read, but which can be overridden if their application leads to nonsensical or ungrammatical interpretations of sentences, and [2] rules of grammar, which make certain interpretations impossible," and questioning whether judges apply the canons consistently with linguistic theory.

See also Nelson, supra note 98 , at , arguing textualists prefer the canons to legislative history because of their more rule-like nature ; William N. The Court's opinions in the last two Terms reflect this revival urged by the new textualists. Nelson, supra note 98 , at Nelson prefers these categories to the traditional distinction between semantic and substantive canons.

Cass R. Nelson, supra note 98 , at "It requires little argument to link canons of this sort to the likely intent of the enacting legislature. Their usefulness in identifying authors' intent is precisely why the principles underlying these canons are widely used in society at large.

See Nelson, supra note 98 , at "Many of the canons used by textualists reflect observations about Congress's own habits. Some of these insights, however, may be incorrect, as discussed in more detail infra , " Studies of Legislative Drafting.

See Scalia, supra note 82 , at 29 "The rule of lenity is almost as old as the common law itself, so I suppose that is validated by sheer antiquity. Wiltberger, 18 U. That knowledge. Christopher J. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd. But see Abbe R. Others argue that even if the constitutional-avoidance canon does not advance legislative supremacy, it may be useful to protect constitutional values, by allowing courts to impose narrowing constructions on constitutionally dubious statutes.

See Eskridge et al. Edward J. See also Breyer, supra note 32 , at arguing legislative history is more accessible than the canons to give notice of statutory meaning. Once it is understood that meaning depends on context, and that contexts vary, how could it be otherwise?

Scalia, supra note 82 , at 27 "Every canon is simply one indication of meaning; and if there are more contrary indications perhaps supported by other canons , it must yield. Rehner, U. In the present case, congressional intent is clear from the face of the statute and its legislative history. Thompson, A. Foreman, A. Sinclair, supra note , at See also Varity Corp. Howe, U. Chertoff, U. In this case, traditional tools of statutory construction and considerations of stare decisis compel [a certain] conclusion.

There is no need for us to resort to the. Roemer, U. If not—and especially if a good reason for the ordinary meaning appears plain—we apply that ordinary meaning. Two concurring opinions in that case argued that the Court should have also considered the statute's legislative history, id. Dep't of Labor, F. Cohen, U. Eskridge et al. This report addresses only pre-enactment legislative history, and does not discuss the even more contentious category of post-enactment legislative history.

The report addresses separately other post-enactment interpretive tools infra " Statutory Implementation. See Weber , U. Dep't of the Navy, U. We will not take the opposite tack of allowing ambiguous legislative history to muddy clear statutory language. Concluding that the text is ambiguous with respect to [that question], we then seek guidance from legislative history.

Or the epitaph on my tombstone, seeing the turn my life had taken in the span of a phone call. Four weeks wasn't a lot of time to find someone willing to cross the Atlantic-from NYC and all the way to Spain-for a wedding. Let alone, someone eager to play along my charade.

But that didn't mean I was desperate enough to bring the 6'4 blue eyed pain in my ass standing before me. Aaron Blackford. The man whose main occupation was making my blood boil had just offered himself to be my date.

Right after inserting his nose in my business, calling me delusional, and calling himself my best option. Blood boiling. And much to my total despair, also right. Which left me with a surly and extra large dilemma in my hands. Was it worth the suffering to bring my colleague and bane of my existence as my fake boyfriend to my sister's wedding? Or was I better off coming clean and facing the consequences of my panic induced lie? Like my abuela would say, que dios nos pille confesados.

Perfect for those looking for a steamy slow-burn with the sweetest Happily Ever After. A wedding in Spain. Three days to convince your family you're actually in love.

Especially when her little white lie about her American boyfriend has spiralled out of control. She only has four weeks to find someone willing to cross the Atlantic for her and aid in her deception. NYC to Spain is no short flight and her family won't be easy to fool. But even then, when Aaron Blackford — the 6'4", blue-eyed pain in the arse — offers to step in, she's not tempted even for a second.

Never has there been a more aggravating, blood-boiling and insufferable man. But Catalina is desperate and as the wedding gets closer the more desirable an option Aaron Blackford becomes. The Spanish Love Deception is an enemies-to-lovers, fake-dating romance. Perfect for those looking for a steamy slow-burn with the promise of a sweet happy-ever-after.

A phone call between two friends unleashes a series of events which threaten to shatter New Zealand's officially accepted history. Matthew Cameron travels to New Zealand to investigate a remarkable archaeological discovery. As the reinstatement may be inadmissible due statute is clear, plain, and free from to ensuing strained relations between the ambiguity, it must be given its literal employer and the employee.

This is what is known as Also, it was held in the case of Victoria v. In such a case, the Court has no recourse but to merely apply the In the case of Globe-Makay Cable and law.

The courts may not speculate as to Radio Corporation v. NLRC,67 the Court the probable intent of the legislature held that the wording of the Labor Code apart from the words. Second, it law controls its letter. COMELEC,71 the from the actual date of proclamation, not Court held that the evident intent of from notice through service of a COCP, Section 74 is to subject an elective local since the losing candidates are not even official to recall election once during his required to be served a copy of the term of office.

Paragraph b construed COCP in the first place. Lastly, it warns together with paragraph a merely the candidates to be more vigilant in designates the period when such elective monitoring the results of the elections for local official may be subject of a recall them to be conscious of the deadline for election, that is, during the second year filing an election protest, should they opt of his term of office.

Thus, subscribing to to contest the results. Hence, the Court petitioner's interpretation of the phrase reversed the COMELEC En Banc regular local election to include the SK decision in favor of Payumo and declared election will unduly circumscribe the that the latter filed out of period with novel provision of the Local Government regard to his election protest.

Code on recall, a mode of removal of public officers by initiation of the people 2. Ratio Legis Est Anima Legis before the end of his term. The spirit rather than the letter of the law. Mens Legislatoris A statute must be read according to its spirit or intent, for what is within the spirit Legislative intent or intent of the is within the statute although it is not legislature or mens legislatoris is a within its letter, and that which is within controlling factor in the construction and the letter but not within the spirit is not interpretation of a law.

The letter of the within the statute. Put a bit differently, law gives way to the true intent of the that which is within the intent of the legislature. And when a statute is lawmaker is as much within the statute as susceptible of more than one if within the letter; and that which is within construction, the Courts shall adopt the the letter of the statute is not within the construction which will most tend to give statute unless within the intent of the effect to the intent of the legislature.

Withal, courts ought not to interpret and should not accept an In the case of Matabuena v. Cervantes,72 interpretation that would defeat the intent the Court invalidated the donation that of the law and its legislators. Thus, common law relationship. Apparently, the applying a verba legis or strictly literal said donation was made in before interpretation of a statute may render it they were married in To The policy of the law which embodies a obviate this aberration, and bearing in deeply-rooted notion of what is just and mind the principle that the intent or the what is right would be nullified if such 70League of Cities of the Philippines vs Comelec, 71 G.

L, March 31, Whatever you do, work at it with all your heart, as working for the Lord, not for men. Certainly a legal norm In the case of People v. Macarandang,74 should not be susceptible to such a the Court held that the appointment of the reproach. If there is ever any occasion accused as secret agent to the assist in where the principle of statutory the maintenance of peace and order construction that what is within the spirit campaigns and detention of crimes, of the law is as much a part of it as what sufficiently put him within the category of is written, this is it.

Otherwise the basic a "peace officer" equivalent even to a purpose discernible in such codal member of the municipal police expressly provision would not be attained. In the Macarandang was later on reversed in language of Justice Pablo: "El espiritu the case of People v. No provision is made for a secret de sus disposiciones. Our task is equally clear. The first and In the case of Prasnik v. Republic,73 the fundamental duty of courts is to apply the Court held that the law evidently intends law.

If the intention were to that application is impossible or allow adoption only to unrecognized inadequate without them. Escudero,76 useful purpose because such children the Court ruled that the appellant was could have been validly adopted even issued a firearm in the performance of his without it. And we say so because a official duties and for his personal natural child not recognized has no right protection.

It also appears that appellant whatever and being considered legally a was informed by Col. Maristela that it was total stranger to his parents, he may be not necessary for him to apply for a adopted under Article The same license or to register the said firearm cannot be said with regard to an because it was government property and acknowledged natural child because, his therefore could not legally be registered filiation having already been established, or licensed in appellant's name.

Bringas from whom appellant general principles governing adoption 2 received the firearm also informed the Manresa 5th ed. There is therefore latter that no permit to carry the pistol was need of an express provision allowing the necessary "because you are already adoption of an acknowledged natural appointed as CIS agent. Dura Lex Sed Lex 73 G. L, March 23, 75 G. L, August 30, 74 G. L, December 23, 76 G.

L, November 15, Whatever you do, work at it with all your heart, as working for the Lord, not for men. Expresio Unius sections and to no other, following the well-known rule of law "inclusio unius est This statutory construction principle exclusio alterius. The claiming to be entitled to the office rule proceeds from the premise that the unlawfully held and exercised by another.

Nissin-Universal Robina Corporation,83 the Court held that under 1 When adherence to such will lead to the new Rules, service of summons upon incongruities and in a violation of the an agent of the corporation is no longer equal protection clause of the authorized. The rule now likewise states Constitution79 "general manager" instead of "manager"; "corporate secretary" instead of merely 2 When enumeration not intended to be "secretary"; and "treasurer" instead of exclusive80 "cashier.

Flor,82 the Court one person excludes all others, or held that if the legislator had intended to expressio unios est exclusio alterius. A simple it could have easily done so by clear and provision would have sufficed for this concise language. Far from it, the legislator has on the contrary especially and specifically 77 G. L, December 23, 80 Manabat vs. L, April 78 Martin Centeno vs.

Victoria Villalon-Pornillos, 29, ; Escribano vs. Avila; G. L, G. September 12, Cruz, G. L, November 29, 81 People vs. Manantan, G. L, July 79 Chua vs. Civil Service Commission, G. Court of Appeals, G. BIR,84 applicable only to things of the same kind the Court held that the legislative intent, or class as those specifically referred to. It is a basic precept of statutory responsible for its distribution.

Nino,87 excludes all others as expressed in the the Court ruled that an iron bar with an familiar maxim expressio unius est iron ball falls within the purview of "other exclusio alterius. Thus, the express deadly weapon" as stated under Act No.

In the said case the Court clarified payment of corporate income tax that the proviso to the Act clearly excludes all others. Not being excepted, indicates that in the view of the legislature petitioner PAGCOR must be regarded as the carrying of an unlicensed revolver coming within the purview of the general would be a violation of the Act.

By the rule that GOCCs shall pay corporate proviso it manifested its intention to income tax. Ejusdem Generis therein specified. Under the well-known principle of But in the case of Parayno v.

Instead, what or class as those specifically referred applied in this case was the legal maxim to. Court held that the use of tape jingle for campaign purposes is not included Hence, because of the distinct and among those propaganda gadgets i. Indeed, the to be disseminated pursuant to the activities undertaken in a "gas service Constitutional Convention Act.

L, November 26, 85 Mutuc v. L, 87 G. L, March 11, November 26, 88 G. Noscitur a Sociis 7. Casus Omisus Pro Omisso Habendus Est Under the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, the meaning of questionable words or Under the said rule, a person, object or phrases in a statute may be ascertained thing omitted from an enumeration must by reference to the meaning of words or be held to have been omitted phrases associated with it.

Rono,92 90 In the case of People v. Manantan, the Justice Teehankee dissents and says Court ruled that the maxim "casus that the basic position of barangay omisus" can operate and apply only if captain and ABC president held by him and when the omission has been clearly are essentially elective. He cannot fall established. In the case under under Section 13 l of the Act which consideration, it has already been shown refers to purely appointive officials, that the legislature did not exclude or omit including active officers and members of justices of the peace from the the Armed Forces of the Philippines and enumeration of officers precluded from officials and employees of government- engaging in partisan political activities.

In the new law, or Section noscitur a sociis. CTA,91 the Court ruled that it is in the second paragraph Sec. By doing so, ultimately that the petitioner-accused did Sec. Nevertheless, the However, the Court still dismissed the accused was convicted by the appellate petition on the ground that the decision of court for, according to the latter, the Collector of Customs should be further receipt of compensation for issuing an elevated to the Commissioner of insurance policy is not an essential Customs before applying for a judicial element for a violation of the first relief based on the sound rule that before paragraph of Section of the one resorts to the Courts, the Insurance Act.

L, February 1, 92 G. L, July 19, 90 G. L, April 12, Whatever you do, work at it with all your heart, as working for the Lord, not for men. Ordinary Meaning discretion upon a party. Under ordinary circumstances, the term "may be" It is a basic rule of statutory construction connotes possibility; it does not connote that if a statute is clear, plain and free certainty.

Not only that; in the matter of interpretation of laws on probation, the In the case of Capati v. Ocampo,97 the Court has pronounced that "the policy of Court ruled that stipulation as to venue in liberality of probation statutes cannot the contract in question is simply prevail against the categorical provisions permissive.

By the said stipulation, the of the law. Castillo,95 the First Instance of Naga. They merely Court denied the application for probation agreed to submit their disputes to the of the petitioner on the ground that said court, without waiving their right to Section 9 paragraph c of the Probation seek recourse in the court specifically Law is in clear and plain language, to the indicated in Section 2 b , Rule 4 of the effect that a person who was previously Rules of Court.

Instance of Pampanga, where the This provision of law is definitive and plaintiff resides, the venue of action is unqualified. There is nothing in Section 9, properly laid in accordance with Section paragraph c which qualifies "previous 2 b , Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.

Luna,98 the that for which the offender is applying for Court held that both the purpose and probation or a crime which arose out of a language of Section 47 as amended by single act or transaction as petitioner Republic Act No. According to the against the petitioner, penalizing her with explanatory note of May and Shall , pp. In order to achieve 94 Pablo v. Castillo, G. De Ocampo, G. L, April 30, 95 G. L, April 30, 98 G. L, February 24, Whatever you do, work at it with all your heart, as working for the Lord, not for men.

There of Section 47 is significant that this is therefore ample justification to grant paragraph did not originally exist: it was fully her petition which is not whimsical introduced By No. If the intention but on the contrary is based on a solid were not to make its enumeration and reasonable ground, i. Besides, the last sentence of Section 4 d.

Previous as amended also by the states that the declaration of location that has no In the case of Rura v. Leopena, the bearing and distance to a tie point us Court determined whether or not Rura herein described shall be null and void. Principally and Exclusively conviction by final judgment. When he applied for probation the only conviction In the case of Alfon v.

Republic,99 the against him was the judgment which was Court ruled that the only reason why the the subject of his application. The statute lower court denied the petitioner's prayer relates "previous" to the date of to change her surname is that as conviction, not to the date of the legitimate child of Filomeno Duterte and commission of the crime.

Hence, Rura is Estrella Alfon she should principally use qualified to apply for probation pursuant the surname of her father invoking Art. But the word amended , more specifically Section 9 "principally" as used in the codal thereof. Every obstacle if a legitimate or legitimated child should choose to use the surname It was held in the case of National of its mother to which it is equally entitled.

Housing Corporation v. Juco, the Court upheld that the Civil Service embraces Since it was satisfactorily shown that every branch, agency, subdivision, and petitioner has, since childhood, borne the instrumentality of the Government, name Estrella S.

Alfon although her birth including every government-owned or records and baptismal certificate show controlled corporation. Alfon; all her without exception. It means all possible friends call her by this name; she finished and all taken one by one.

Of course, our 99 G. L, May 29, G. L, January 17, G. L June 19, Whatever you do, work at it with all your heart, as working for the Lord, not for men. It does not and convincing reason why the law would cover cases involving private firms taken allow municipal imposition of taxes on over by the government in foreclosure or gasoline and yet withhold such power if similar proceedings.

Surplusage courses of action in the exercise of their taxing powers are denied to In the case of Demafiles v. COMELEC, municipalities and municipal districts, to the Court still took cognizance of the case wit: despite of the contention of Galido that the case is moot and academic since he a. To levy any sales tax in whatever had took his oath and assumed office as form; and a mayor on November 22, pursuant to Republic Act